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State Action After Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.':
Analytical Framework
for a Restrictive Doctrine
I. Introduction
In the Civil Rights Cases2 the United States Supreme Court held that
although the equal protection and due process provisions of the fourteenth
amendment and of civil rights legislation apply to "[s]tate action of every
kind," they do not prohibit the "individual invasion of individual rights. "
3
This fundamental dichotomy between the acts of private parties and those
of the state4 has become a focal point of civil rights litigation. Since 1883
courts have been seeking effective criteria for deciding whether ostensibly
private acts are so closely connected with the state that they should be
regarded as "state action," ,5 but the line between state and individual has
never been clearly drawn. In a broad range of civil rights cases a finding of
state action is prerequisite to recovery,6 although in some circumstances
recovery may be had against purely private actors. 7 Since the state action
1. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
2. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
3. Id. at 11. For discussion and criticism of the cases' holding that parts of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 were unconstitutional see C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT-CIVIL
PRACTICE § 162, at 236 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ANTIEAU]; A. LAFRANCE, M. SCHROEDER,
R. BENNETr & W. BOYD, LAW OFTHE POOR, 446-47 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LAFRANCE].
4. For more recent expositions of this dichotomy, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,172 (1972); Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
5. It is suggested that the term "indirect" state action be used to distinguish the
state-connected acts of private persons from the acts of public officials, which might better be
described as "direct" state action. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Alford, 410 F. Supp.
1348 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1254 n.20, 1258 n.40
(W.D.N.C. 1975).
6. The most common statutory cause of action is provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
See Bristow, Section 1983: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 29 ARK. L. REV. 255, 266-74
(1975). See generally LAFRANCE, supra note 3, §§ 417-19.
7. State action need not be shown in the following types of cases: voting rights cases
under 42 U.S.C. § 197(b) (1970); property rights or private contract cases under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1970), e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976), or under42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970);
conspiracy cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970), see note 198 and accompanying text infra;
involuntary servitude claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1970) or under the thirteenth amend-
ment; public accommodation rights cases under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), (b), (c) (1970); cases of
discriminatory administration of federally funded programs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970);
equal employment cases under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 1971); or housing claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970). See 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 285 (1974). See generally ANTIEAU, supra
note 3, §§ 32-38. See also LAFRANCE, supra note 3, at 443. For discussion of choice of
remedies, see Comment, Selecting a Remedy for Private Racial Discrimination: Statutes in
Search of Scope, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 303 (1976).
determination is a threshold requirement8 in litigating equal protection, due
process, and other constitutional claims, its significance. cannot be
overstated.9
The history of the state action doctrine is one of slow but dramatic
shifts.' 0 The traditional restrictive approach enunciated in the Civil Rights
Cases, I I permitting application of the fourteenth amendment only to state
laws and actions taken under state authority, underwent little change for
seventy years. Then, in 1948, the Court held in Shelley v. Kraemer12 that
although private racially discriminatory restrictive covenants do not in
themselves violate constitutional prohibitions, their enforcement in state
courts constitutes state action and violates the equal protection clause. 1
3
Four years later, in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,14 the Court
found state action in a transit company's playing of radio programs in
streetcars. 15 This trend toward a less restrictive doctrine peaked in 1961 in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority. 16 In Burton the Court attributed
state action to the management of a racially discriminatory restaurant
leasing premises in a public parking garage on the theory that the state had
"so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with the
restaurant as to be a "joint participant in the challenged activity."1 7 This
"entwinement" or "symbiosis" theory became a frequent tenet of state
action arguments. 8 On several subsequent occasions the Supreme Court
8. See Lamont v. Forman Bros., Inc., 410F. Supp. 912,918 (D.D.C. 1976); Reeves v.
American Optical Co., 408 F. Supp. 297 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (cases lost for failure to plead state
action).
9. State action has been described as the "most important problem in American law."
Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967). The impact of a "no state action"
finding is significant: no cause of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), no jurisdiction
exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), and fourteenth amendment prohibitions are inapplic-
able. Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (E.D. Wisc.
1975). See Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 516 F.2d 1328, 1331 (3d Cir. 1975); LAFR-
ANCE, supra note 3, at 443.
10. For thorough historical treatment see Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466
F.2d 638, 658-65 (7th Cir. 1972); Bassett, The Reemergence of the "StateAction "Requirement
in Race Relations Cases, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 39 (1972); Black, supra note 9; Burke & Reber,
State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 and 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1(1973); Hemphill, State Action
and Civil Rights, 23 MERC. L. REV. 519 (1972); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX.
L. REV. 347 (1963); Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to
Private Activity, 74 COL. L. REV. 656 (1974) [hereinafter cited as State Action: Theories];
Note, Public Utilities-State Action and Informal Due Process After Jackson, 53 N.C.L. REV.
817 (1975); Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974).
11. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
13. "[B]ut for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply
of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question without
restraint." Id. at 19. The Court noted that the same courts that enforced the agreements had
originally formulated the policy of doing so. "The judicial action .. .bears the clear and
unmistakable imprimatur of the State." Id. at 20.
14. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
15. The decision turned on the fact that the Public Utilities Commission had conducted
an investigation and public hearings and had determined that the "public safety, comfort and
convenience" were not impaired by defendant's acts. The Court did not rely on defendant's
mere status as a public utility or its enjoyment of monopoly status. 343 U.S. at 462.
16. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
17. Id. at 725. The Court noted that the operation of the restaurant increased the profits
of the parking garage and that these profits were presumably greater as the result of
discriminatory practices. Id. at 724.
18. See notes 182-96 and accompanying text infra.
found state action in race discrimination cases, 19 and lower courts
expanded the doctrine, prompting commentators to conclude that the state
action requirement had been "judicially buried." 20
In the early 1970's, however, this expansive trend began to reverse.
21
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis22 the Court held that the discriminatory
guest policies of a private club stood outside constitutional restraints
despite licensing and regulation of the club by state liquor control
authorities. 23 Then, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,24 the Court
refused to implicate the state in the activities of a privately owned public
utility that had terminated a customer's electric service without a hearing.
The utility's acts were purely private, the Court ruled, although the utility
underwent extensive state regulation, enjoyed a state-granted partial
monopoly, and operated under a state-approved tariff that included termi-
nation provisions. The Jackson decision made it clear that state action
would not be found in the absence of a direct nexus between state
involvement and a defendant's challenged acts.
Since Jackson the finding of a direct nexus has dominated the state
action determination, but the nexus requirement has proven difficult to
apply. This comment examines the state action doctrine as reflected in
post-Jackson case law. 25 Emphasis is placed on the theories under which
the existence of state action has been argued 26 and the ambiguous,
19. Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (white teacher denied service because
accompanied by black students, and arrested for vagrancy by policeman who had conspired
with lunchroom manager); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (suit by white board of
managers to install private trustee to enforce testamentary trust of land as park for whites);
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (blacks convicted of trespass for failure to
leave lunch counter that had been closed pursuant to city ordinance when they seated
themselves).
20. Hemphill, supra note 10, at 533. See Williams, supra note 10, at 382 (citing Burton as
the Supreme Court foundation for abandoning the state action analysis).
21. One commentator remarked in 1974:
After decades of almost limitless expansion of the state action concept and the
accompanying application of the Constitution to activities once considered private
in nature, the Supreme Court, led by the Nixon appointees, has called a halt. In the
most recent state action cases, the Court has sheltered the private realm of
decisionmaking from constitutional restraints in spite of state connections with the
private actor.
Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840, 863 (1974). See also Bassett,
supra note 10.
22. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
23. There was no suggestion in the record that state regulation "[I1n any way foster[ed]
or encourage[d] racial discrimination." Id. at 176-77. Although the Court found no state
action in the club policies, it did enjoin state liquor board regulations that required licensees to
adhere to club bylaws since discriminatory provisions had been written into the bylaws. Id. at
178-79. The Court distinguished Burton in that there was here "nothing approaching the
symbiotic relationship between lessor and lessee" that existed in that case. Id. at 175. Moose
Lodge and Burton have since been reconciled somewhat ingenuously on the basis of "the
difference between a private club and a restaurant in a public building." Weise v. Syracuse
Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. 419 U.S. 345 (1974); noted at 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 867 (1975); 24 CATH.
U.L. REV. 622 (1975); 24 EMORY L.J. 511 (1975); 53 N.C.L. REV. 817 (1975); 9 U. RIcH. L.
REV. 760 (1975). For discussion of Jackson and Burton see Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514
F.2d 285, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1975); Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118, 124-26(W.D.
Pa. 1975).
25. It treats federal case law as recent as Buck v. Board of Elections, 536 F.2d 522 (2d
Cir. 1976) and Weiss v. J.C. Penney Co., 414 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
26. For more general reviews of these theories see ANTIEAU, supra note 3, §§ 32-38;
LAFRANCE, supra note 3, §§ 417-19; Comment, State Action: Judicial Perpetuation of the
overlapping and often inconsistently applied criteria that courts have
generated in passing on state action allegations. 27 The ensuing enumeration
of tests and criteria identifies significant state action considerations but also
illustrates the difficulty of attempting to formulate comprehensive
standards.
II. The State Action Doctrine-Judicial Approaches
There are several major variables in litigation in which state action is
at issue, including the constitutional rights asserted,2 8 the causes of action
and jurisdictional bases pleaded,2 9 the private interests challenged,30 the
theories of state involvement argued,31 and the factual circumstances
present in each case. 32 Courts dispute whether arguments applicable in one
context relate with equal validity to other forms of state involvement, other
constitutional provisions, or other causes of action. 33 Courts agree, how-
State/Private Distinction, 2 OHIo NORTHERN L. REV. 722 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Judicial
Perpetuation]; works cited, supra note 10.
27. It has been observed that "[tfaking it as a whole ... [state action] is a 'doctrine'
without shape or line. The doctrine-in-chief is a slogan from 1883. The sub-doctrines are
nothing but discordant suggestions . . . . The field is a conceptual disaster area .... "
Black, supra note 9, at 95. The crux of the present inquiry is whether one may now find among
the rubble of this "disaster area" the roots of a viable analytical tree.
28. Most cases derive from equal protection, due process, and first amendment claims,
although occasional fifth amendment and miscellaneous fourteenth amendment claims arise.
See notes 37-43 and accompanying text infra.
29. In addition to general fourteenth or fifth amendment claims, statutory causes of
action arise under the Civil Rights Acts, principally under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See
generally ANTIEAU, supra note 3. Whether jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1343
(1970) or on some other basis has no bearing on state action analysis. See Howard Univ. v.
NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
30. The case law has evolved along general lines related to the nature of defendants'
activities, e.g., universities, hospitals, utilities. Several of these categories are discussed
briefly at notes 44-82 and accompanying text infra.
31. These theories are discussed in depth at notes 83-201 and accompanying text infra.
32. Other variables in state action cases include the source of the decision to perform
the challenged act, i.e., individual or managerial, and the type of relief requested, e.g.,
injunction of state aid, injunction of challenged activities, or damages. These considerations
have had little bearing on the outcome of state action determinations.
33. ;[T]he applicability of precedent in state action cases should be tempered by the
caveat that 'decisions dealing with one form of state involvement and a particular
provision of the Bill of Rights [are not] at all determinative in passing upon claims
concerning different forms of government involvement and other constitutional
guarantees.'
Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397,404 (2d Cir. 1975), quotingWahba v. New York Univ.,
492 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1974); see note 230 infra. The Seventh Circuit has asserted, to the
contrary, that state action analysis is no different for equal protection claims than for due
process claims. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975).
The consensus seems to favor equivalency of standards. See Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l
Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547,550 (9th Cir. 1974); Weiss v. J.C. Penney Co., 414 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. I11.
1976) ("state action" requirement of fourteenth amendment and "color of state law"
requirement of § 1983 "substantially the same"); Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated
Mortgage Inv., 504 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment federal action standards
identical to fourteenth amendment state action standards); Fine v. City of New York, 529
F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1975) ("color of state law" equivalent under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its criminal
counterr,. , 18 U.S.C. § 242); Timson v. Weiner, 395 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (S.D. Oh. 1975)
("color of state law" under § 1983 or under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) synonymous with "state
action" under fourteenth amendment). See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7
(1966).
Action under color of federal law or in concert with federal officials does not constitute
state action for fourteenth amendment or § 1983 purposes, but remedies exist for deprivation
of fourth, fifth or sixth amendment rights. McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.
1976); Williams v. Howard Univ., 528 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (District of Columbia not a
"state"); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988, 994-97 (S.D. Ga. 1975); Fenner
v. Bruce Manor, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1332, 1343 (D. Md. 1976); Mitchell v. Carlson, 404 F.
Supp. 1220 (D. Kan. 1975).
ever, that the facts of each case must be evaluated in light of all applicable
criteria. 
34
Recent state action cases defy categorization into any comprehensive
digestive framework, but can be grouped loosely in several ways. Since the
search for state action is a factual inquiry, courts have sometimes adopted
what may be termed a "case line" approach, focusing their discussion
upon a factually related line of cases. 35 Other courts may be said to have
adopted a "constitutional" approach, basing their analysis upon the
constitutional rights asserted in the case at hand. 36 Because of the historical
significance of the "constitutional" and "case line" approaches, their
relevance to recent case law will be briefly considered.
In recent cases, litigants generally argue several theories of state
involvement and courts consider the application of these theories in
analogous though factually dissimilar circumstances. The principal part of
this inquiry is therefore devoted to a review of the "theories of state
involvement" argued by litigants attempting to prove state action. These
arguments are based on the nature of alleged governmental interaction with
private defendants rather than the factual setting of the case or the particular
rights asserted. They thus cut across case lines and require independent
consideration.
A. The "Constitutional" Approach
The state action doctrine underwent its early development in equal
protection litigation, particularly in race discrimination cases. 3 7 Because of
34. Courts frequently observe- that a "case by case" approach is required. See
Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 536 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1976); notes 229-38 and
accompanying text infra.
35. See Berrios v. Inter Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (1st Cir. 1976); Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (university cases); Doe v. Charleston Area
Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638,642 (4th Cir. 1975); Baron v. Carson, 410 F. Supp. 299,302
(N.D. Itl. 1976); Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. I11. 1975) (hospital cases);
Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (racetrack cases).
The tendency to digest state action cases into factual groups is apparent in commentary
as well as decisions. See Bassett, supra note 10 (race discrimination cases); Comment,
Constitutional Restrictions on Termination of Services by Privately Owned Public Utilities, 39
Mo. L. REV. 205 (1974); Comment, The Entitlement to Municipal Water Service: Constitu-
tional Problems in the Termination of a Public Utility Service, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 285 (1975)
(utilities cases); Comment, State Action in Self-Help Automobile Repossession, 14 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 659 (1974); Comment, State Action Considerations and Economic Implications
of Holding Self-Help Repossessions Unconstitutional, 1973 LAW & Soc. 0. 707; Comment,
State Action and the Constitutionality of UCC § 9-503, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547 (1973)
(creditor cases); Leslie, Governmental Action and Standing: NLRB Certification of Dis-
criminatory Unions, 1974 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 35 (union cases); Hendrickson, "State Action"
and Private Higher Education, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 53 (1973) (university cases).
36. E.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975). "[T]he analysis of the
sufficiency of state action is inextricably grafted to the nature of the constitutional right
purportedly vitiated." Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D. Va.
1976). "[W]e must ... look to the nature of the right infringed as well as the extent of the
state's involvement." Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 1975). The
application in some jurisdictions of less restrictive standards to race discrimination cases is a
product of this "constitutional" approach. Seenotes 38, 207-08 and accompanying text infra.
37. Some of the significant early cases were Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)
(private trust); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (lunch counter); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (segregated schools); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(restrictive covenants); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (innkeepers). For historical
the important and sensitive nature of the rights at issue in those cases, some
courts adopted and continue to apply special, less restrictive state action
criteria to racially discriminatory defendants. 37a On the whole, however,
post-Jackson discrimination cases display a low incidence of state action
findings.
38
Unlike equal protection allegations, fourteenth amendment due proc-
ess claims have not been accorded special state action standards, and state
action has posed a considerable barrier to recovery. 39 Indicative of the
treatment see Bassett, supra note 9; Hemphill, supra note 9; Leslie, GovernmentalAction and
Standing: NLRB Certification of Discriminatory Unions, 1974 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 35, 46-69;
Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1056-64 (1968); Note,
Constitutionality of Federal Tax Benefits to Private Segregated Schools, 11 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 289 (1975); 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 285 (1974).
37a. See note 208 and accompanying text infra.
38. Early cases suggested that private racially discriminatory organizations performing
"public functions" would generally be state actors for equal protection purposes. Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966) (private park rendering municipal service); cf. Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461,469-70 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,661-64 (1944) (political
parties managing primary electoral process).
Recent decisions, however, require either a specific nexus between the function per-
formed and the infringement of plaintiff's rights, Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1!10
(9th Cir. 1975), or state involvement in the decision to discriminate, Player v. Alabama Dept.
of Pen. & Sec., 400 F. Supp. 249 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
Similarly, recent holdings fail to support earlier indications that private racially dis-
criminatory parties are generally subject to constitutional scrutiny if they are state-regulated,
compare Holmes v. Elks Club, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 854 (M.D. Fla. 1975) with Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) and Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir.
1973), if they exert broad influence in the community, compare De Matteis v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975) with Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,506-09 (1946), or
if they rely on state laws, compare Battle v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 399 F. Supp. 900 (D.
Minn. 1975) with Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) andPeterson v. City of Greenville,
373 U.S. 244 (1963), or judicial pronouncements, compare First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523
S.W.2d 808, 820-22 (Mo. 1975) with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Most recent claims of sex discrimination and other equal protection infringements have
likewise failed to elicit state action findings. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th
Cir. 1975); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Magill v. Avonworth
Baseball Conf., 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975); New York City Jaycees v. United States
Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975); Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri State J.C. of
C., 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975); Raether v. Phillips, 401 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Va. 1975);
Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Stearns v. VFW,
394 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975). Nevertheless, state action has been found in a few cases on
theories of Burton-like entanglement, Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975), police enforcement, Johnson
v. Heinemann Candy Co., 402 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Wis. 1975), private influence on public
organizations, Leffel v. Wisconsin Intersch. Athl. Ass'n, 398 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Wis. 1975),
and state-directed decisions to discriminate, Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp.
363 (D. Ore. 1975).
39. See generally Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors'
Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 and 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1973); Comment, State Action and the Constitutionality of UCC§ 9-503, 30 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 547 (1973). See Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975); Turner v.
Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights
and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 532,561-76(1975). Plaintiffs have had little success in challenges to
creditors' ex-parte remedies, especially self-help repossession. Although some courts have
detected state action on the theory that the creditor performed a public function, in most cases
state action had not been found, seeBarrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th
Cir. 1975); Comment, State Action Consideration and Economic Implications of Holding
Self-Help Repossessions Unconstitutional, 1973 LAW & Soc. 0. 707; Comment, StateAction
in Self-Help Automobile Repossession, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 659 (1974); Comment, State
Action and the Constitutionality of UCC § 9-503, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 573 (1973); 7
AKRON L. REV. 331 (1974); 7 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 176 (1975); 6 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1135
(1975).
Recent decisions have reached discordant positions on the state action aspect of sale of
goods pursuant to possessory liens, see Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 1059,
1062-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975), foreclosure on
mortgages under deeds of trust, compare Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d
impracticality of attempting to reconcile state action cases on the basis of
constitutional rights asserted, state action has been alleged in a broad range
of first amendment, 4° fifth amendment, 41 and miscellaneous fourteenth
amendment claims42 that have neither received separate treatment nor
generated excessive amounts of litigation. Such cases can be decided or
understood only in the context of the general "theories of state involve-
ment" discussed below.43
B. The "Case Line" Approach
Contemporary decisions seldom confine their search for precedent to
factually similar cases, and such an approach does not lend itself to
resolution of the state action issue in most controversies since they do not
fall within any common class. Nevertheless, certain "case lines" have
evolved and maintain an individual existence. The criteria considered by
courts in appraising state action claims in these case lines will be briefly
enumerated, with the caveat that no factual consideration is either essential
to or individually dispositive of the state action determination.
1. Common Case Lines.
(a) Private university cases.---'Whether the actions of private
1166 (5th Cir. 1975) and Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975) with Turner v.
Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975), and distraint of tenants' property by
landlords and innkeepers, compare Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th
Cir. 1975) and Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975) with Johnson v. Riverside
Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975) and Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.
1970); seeRagin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975); accord, Musselman v. Spies,
343 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Pa. 1972). ButseeGross v. Fox, 496F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1974), revg349
F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
The constitutionality of ex parte termination of utility services has been frequently
contested. See generally Comment, Constitutional Restrictions on Termination of Services by
Privately Owned Public Utilities, 39 Mo. L. REV. 205 (1974); Comment, The Entitlement to
Municipal Water Service: Constitutional Problems in the Termination of a Public Utility
Service, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 285 (1975); 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 867(1975); 14 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. REV. 317 (1972); 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 622 (1975); 24 EMORY L.J. 511 (1975); 53 N.C.L.
REV. 817 (1975); 9 U. RicH. L. REV. 760 (1975). Pre-Jackson cases are split on the state action
question, compare Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) with
Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973), and it is uncertain to what extent
Jackson has resolved the split. CompareCondosta v. Vermont Elec. Coop., Inc., 400 F. Supp.
358 (D. Vt. 1975) (distinguishing Jackson) with Teleco, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 511
F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1975) (following Jackson) and Brown v. D.C. Transit Sys., 523 F.2d 725
(D.C. Cir. 1975). See Srack v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 391 F. Supp. 155, 159 (S.D. Iowa
1975); note 96 infra.
The only generalization that can be made about other recent due process cases is that
those in which state action has been found are mavericks. SeeSotomura v. County of Hawaii,
402 F. Supp. 95 (D. Hawaii 1975); United States General, Inc. v. Schroeder, 400 F. Supp. 713
(E.D. Wis. 1975).
40. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Watkins v. Mercy
Medical Center, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975); Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514 F,2d 285 (2d Cir.
1975); Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000
(1975); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Timson v.
Weiner, 395 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Walton v. Darby Town Houses, Inc., 395 F.
Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. II1. 1975);
Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655 (D.N.J. 1975); see 62 GEO. L.J. 1783 (1974).
41. United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. E.g., Doyle v. Unicare Health Serv., 399 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. 111. 1975).
43. See notes 83-201 and accompanying text infra.
44. See generally Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 403-04 (2d Cir. 1975);
Hendrickson. "State Action" and Private Higher Education, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 53 (1973). A
universities constitute state action has frequently been litigated, with
varying results. 4 Although policy considerations peculiar to universities
may affect the outcome, 46 several factual circumstances are commonly
considered:
(1) the amount and nature of financial aid provided by the
state ;47
(2) the manner of acquisition of real property;
(3) regulatory powers exercised by the state over educational
standards and other policies;
(4) the nature and extent of state contracts;
(5) the conduct of government-sponsored or government-
related research projects; 48 and
(6) the intent of the university and the state as to their
relationship .
It has been held that education is not per se a "public function" 50 and that
there must be a direct causal connection between any governmental
involvement and the specific contested act or policy. 51 Further, even
though a causal nexus exists, courts weigh on a case-by-case basis the
degree to which state involvement affects a defendant's challenged
actions. 52
(b) Private hospital cases.- 53 The factual matters considered in
separate line of cases has grown around private secondary schools, see Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045,
1056-64 (1968); Note, Constitutionality ofFederal Tax Benefits to Private Segregated Schools,
II WAKE FOREST L. REV. 289 (1975); 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 285 (1974).
45. Results have varied even within single jurisdictions. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ.,
522 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. [T]he courts are probably wise in their reluctance to apply full constitutional
protection to the private university setting, for application of the enormous array of
duties imposed by the Constitution. . .would accomplish too much. Full applica-
tion might, for example, raise questions about establishment or free exercise of
religion, and might serve to undermine the advantages of diverse educational
experiences which a variety of private universities can offer.
Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Students, 84 YALE L.J. 120, 122 n.5 (1974),
quoted in Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407 n.13 (2d Cir. 1975).
47. See note lll infra (amount of aid). The significance of the natureof the aid lies in its
relevance to the challenged acts and whether it is provided selectively rather than to all
universities. Typical types of aid include grants, tax incentives, and contractual remunera-
tion. See Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. Although evidence of extensive government contracting would tend to support
state action, one court felt that the performance of socially valuable research under contract
would weigh against a state action finding. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d
Cir. 1974).
49. Intent must be shown by the total available evidence. In Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73,
82 (2d Cir. 1968), the dubious conclusion was reached that "[tlhe very name of the college
[New York State College of Ceramics] identifies it as a state institution." Contra, Cohen v.
Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 824-25 (7th Cir. 1975):
[Ulse of the [sitate's name gives rise to the appearance of [s]tate involvement,.
but . . .unless the appearance . . . either facilitates the activity in question, or
provides evidence that the institution is, in fact, a [s]tate instrumentality, it is of no
relevance.
50. Barrios v. Inter Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (1st Cir. 1976); Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 404 n.6 (2d Cir. 1975).
51. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 823-27 (7th Cir. 1975). It has been
suggested, however, that Burton-like symbiotic relationships are possible in the absence of a
direct nexus. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975); Braden v.
University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
52. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. III. 1976); notes
98-104 and accompanying text infra.
53. See generally Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. IIl. 1975); Doyle v.
Unicare Health Serv., 399 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. I1. 1975).
subjecting hospitals to a state action determination are similar to the
university criteria. The following circumstances are considered:
(1) the nature and amount of public financing;
5 4
(2) the manner of acquisition of real property;5 5
(3) the extent of state regulation, control, and inspection; 6
(4) the operation of state programs; 57
(5) whether the hospital provides essential services;5 8 and
(6) whether patients must rely on the hospital for specific types
of treatment.
5 9
As in the university cases, merely to show state involvement is not enough.
The involvement must be significant, 60 must relate to the specific policy or
decision that caused the injury, 6' and must aid, encourage, or connote
approval of the challenged acts .62
(c) Private utility cases.- 63In deciding whether privately operated
public utilities are state actors, courts have often considered these factors:
(1) the extent and nature of state regulation;'
54. Although financing is considered, it has been held that the receipt of Hill-Burton
funds or other governmental aid or the enjoyment of tax benefits does not per se support state
action findings. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Watkins v. Mercy
Medical Center, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975); Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072
(N.D. III. 1975); 62 GEO. L.J. 1783 (1974). But see Large v. Reynolds, 414 F. Supp. 45 (W.D.
Va. 1976).
55. But merely leasing property from the county does not make a hospital a state actor.
Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975).
56. State action has been found when hospital policy was "regulated to the [state
anti-abortion] statute .. "Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 529 F.2d 638,641(4th
Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, findings that a hospital's functions were "pervasively" state
regulated, that state control was exercised, and that regular state inspections were conducted
have been held not to connote state action. Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363
(D. Ore. 1975).
57. Such operations do not, however, indicate state action with respect to acts
unrelated to the specific programs. Sament-v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 413 F.
Supp. 434, 439 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Doyle v. Unicare Health Serv., 399 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. III. 1975).
58. The "public function per se" argument fails, Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523
F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1000 (1975); courts consider, rather, the specific nature of essential services provided.
59. De facto monopoly status alone is not, however, sufficient to support state action
findings. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975).
60. Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. II1. 1975). See note 211 and
accompanying text infra.
61. Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 529 F.2d 638,642-43 (4th Cir. 1975); Greco
v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000(1975). If the state
has not sought to influence or regulate the policy, it must at least have sanctioned it or given
tacit approval. Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. III. 1975). This
"nexus" requirement has blocked state action findings in several cases. Watkins v. Mercy
Medical Center, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975); Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D.
III. 1975); Doyle v. Unicare Health Serv., 399 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. III. 1975).
62. This "three-pronged test" of state action in hospital cases was stated in Aasum v.
Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Ore. 1975), in which state action was found
when a state agency recommended that the hospital not allow certain persons to use its
facilities.
63. See generally Comment, Constitutional Restrictions on Termination of Services by
Privately Owned Public Utilities, 39 Mo. L. REV. 205 (1974); Comment, The Entitlement to
Municipal Water Service: Constitutional Problems in the Termination of a Public Utility
Service, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 285 (1975); 24 EMORY L.J. 511 (1975).
Municipally owned and controlled utilities are to be distinguished. See Craft v. Memphis
Light, Gas and Water Division, 534 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139,
143-44 (5th Cir. 1974).
64. Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding state action because
company operations were fully regulated by "all-encompassing system" of state statutes);
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (no state action because
state merely approved general tariff); Srack v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 391 F. Supp. 155
(2) whether the utility leases public property;65
(3) the extent to which the utility is "connected with the public
interest";66 and
(4) whether the utility is a publicly franchised monopoly.
67
As in the university and hospital cases, post-Jackson decisions look for a
nexus between the state involvement and the challenged act. 68 This nexus
criterion has been extended by one court to require that the state specifi-
cally authorize, order, or approve the act.
69
(d) Private employer cases.-Employer cases vary widely, encom-
passing utilities,70 universities, 71 and other organizations. On the whole
they have not generated "case line" analysis, but with regard to a defense
contractor the following factors were considered:
72
(1) the percentage of total output attributable to government
contracts;
(2) the use of government property;
(3) the amount and nature of governmental support;
(4) provisions for governmental inspection and quality control;
and
(5) other facts indicating direct ties with the government.73
As in other factual situations, the determination ultimately depends on the
nexus requrement.
74
(e) Private association cases.-Factual considerations relevant to
clubs and non-profit organizations were set forth in Jackson v. Statler
(S.D. Iowa 1975) (no state action despite regulation setting forth grounds for termination,
since regulation did not say the utility must terminate the services); cf. Brown v. D.C. Transit
Sys., 523 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (heavy regulation not ipso facto sufficient to find state
action).
65. This consideration is of limited significance. But see Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1974).
66. Utilities have generally not been considered to be "connected with the public
interest" to the extent of being "public functions." Id. at 353. But see Lucas v. Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 663 (7th Cir. 1972) (dissent).
67. Recent cases place little emphasis on the enjoyment of a monopoly or "exclusive
franchise." Even in the heyday of state action, courts did not rely on this factor alone. Public
Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,462 (1952); see LAFRANCE, supra note 3, at 458 & n.76;
notes 113-15 and accompanying text infra.
68. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974); McLellan v.
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976). See Public Util. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (nexus provided by state approval of procedures after investiga-
tion); Brown v. D.C. Transit Sys., 523 F.2d 725, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (describing absence of
nexus as state's failure to "exercise jurisdiction over [the] subject matter"); Uhl v. Ness City,
406 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (D. Kan. 1975) (nexus found when services terminated pursuant to
municipal ordinance); Condosta v. Vermont Elec. Coop., 400 F. Supp. 358, 364-65 (D. Vt.
1975) (defendant instructed by state to terminate plaintiff's services).
69. Srack v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 391 F. Supp. 155 (S.D. Iowa 1975). SeeTeleco,
Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 511 F.2d 949, 952 (10th Cir. 1975), quoting Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (state regulatory body did not "put its own
weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it"); notes 101-04 and accompanying
text infra.
70. E.g., Brown v. D.C. Transit Sys., 523 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Taterka v.
Wisconsin Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
71. E.g., Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118
(W.D. Pa. 1975).
72. Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975), noted at 51 N.Y.U.L. REV.
311 (1976).
73. An example is delivery of goods to the government at the plant. Id.
74. Nexus was provided in Holodnak by government prohibition of plaintiff's dissident
publishing and a common interest in preventing labor unrest. Id. at 289-90.
Foundation:"
(1) the degree to which the organization depends on govern-
mental aid;76
(2) the extent and intrusiveness of the governmental regulatory
scheme ;77
(3) whether the aid provided connotes governmental approval
of the activity ;78
(4) the extent to which the organization serves a public func-
tion;79 and
(5) "whether the organization has legitimate claims to recogni-
tion as a 'private' oranization in associational or other
constitutional terms.-8
Mere state licensing of a private organization is immaterial unless the state
has other connections with the disputed conduct. 8' In some cases, how-
ever, a Burton symbiosis may be found absent many of these
circumstances. 82
2. Deficiencies of the "Case Line" Approach.-This brief look at
the principal factual circumstances considered by courts in deciding
common types of cases reveals several weaknesses of the "case line"
approach. Many of the listed considerations are obvious-their restate-
ment amounts to little more than the truism that courts must always look at
the facts of the case. Many apply with equal validity in other factual
settings, so that there is nothing to gain from their tabulation in "case line"
75. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974). The foundation's tax exempt status was challenged.
Remanding, the court of appeals suggested that state action would exist if the foundation was
substantially dependent upon its tax exempt status, if the regulatory scheme was both detailed
and intrusive, if the scheme bore connotations of governmental approval, if the foundation
had no substantial claim of constitutional protection, and if the foundation served some public
function. The court indicated that each of the enumerated factors is material although no
single factor is conclusive, and that a finding of state action could be appropriate even if one of
the factors was absent. The opinion suggested, however, that state action would be the
exception rather than the rule: "On remand, the parties may be able to point to individual
circumstances which distinguish the defendants from exempt private foundations generally."
Id. at 634.
76. For an example of de minimis support, see Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 516
F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975), suggesting that the proportion of the organization's total needs
provided is significant. But if the government funds are earmarked for activites not related to
the specific challenged conduct, insufficient nexus exists. Junior Chamber of Commerce v.
Missouri State J.C. of C., 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975).
77. Cf. Stearns v. VFW, 394 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975) (no state action despite
involved and extensive regulation).
78. Again, a nexus to the challenged conduct is critical. Magill v. Avonworth Baseball
Conf., 516 F.2d 1328, 1335 (3d Cir. 1975). In Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri State
J.C. of C., 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975), the court seemed to adopt a comparative approach,
concluding that the nexus was not as close as in Jackson or Moose Lodge. See Note, State
Action and the United States Junior Chamber of Commerce, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1407
(1975).
79. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 218 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[Wlere the
NCAA to disappear . . . [the] government would soon step in to fill the void."); see New
York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856,859-60 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussion of
public function doctrine).
80. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974). See Leffel v.
Wisconsin Intersch. Athl. Ass'n, 398 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
81. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16, 18-19 (5th Cir. 1976); Rosado
Maysonet v. Solis, 409 F. Supp. 576, 581 (D.P.R. 1975); Holmes v. Elks Club, Inc., 389 F.
Supp. 854 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
82. See Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Cf. New York City
Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975). Seetext at notes 17-18 supra;
notes 182-88 and accompanying text infra.
categories. Furthermore, as was cautioned above, none of these enumer-
ated considerations is either essential or dispositive as a state action
criterion. The final determination depends, rather, on the establishment of
a "nexus" and the showing of "significant state involvement," require-
ments that are common to all lines of cases.
The "theories of state invlovement" discussed below apply without
regard to the "line" to which the case belongs. They therefore provide
more flexibility, broader perspective, and a greater likelihood of arriving at
a just determination than can be expected from any narrow "case line"
approach.
C. Theories of State Involvement83
As may be seen from recent cases, the line between public and private
behavior is tortuous and indistinct. Taking the cases as a whole, however,
one may observe the emergence of some semblance of an analytical
framework. Courts appear to be placing increasing reliance on objective
"analytical" criteria, although the final test is always a subjective apprai-
sal of the degree to which the criteria apply in the case at hand. The facile
conclusion that "sifting facts and weighing circumstances ' 84 is the only
valid approach overlooks the necessity of utilizing cognizable theories as
the seive of those facts.
1. Governmental Regulation or Control. -A prevalent argument in
state action allegations is that the defendant's acts should be treated as
those of the state because the state has so pervasively regulated the
defendant's activities as to make itself responsible for the alleged infringe-
ment of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 85 This "extensive governmen-
tal regulation" theory had its heyday in the 1950's and 1960's, but has
recently undergone considerable limitation.
86
83. A number of pre-Jackson discussions reviewed the state action theories in great
historical detail. See ANTIEAU, supra note 3, §§ 32-38; LAFRANCE, supra note 3, §§ 417-19;
works cited note 10 supra. For discussion of the theories as they relate to race cases, see
Bassett, supra note 10, at 48. As to utilities cases, see Comment, Constitutional Restrictions
on Termination of Services by Privately Owned Public Utilities, 39 Mo. L. REv. 205 (1974); 14
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 317 (1972). As to creditors' rights cases, see Comment, State
Action Considerations and Economic Implications of Holding Self-Help Repossessions
Unconstitutional, 1973 LAW & Soc. 0. 707, 713-25; Comment, State Action and the
Constitutionality of UCC§9-503, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547,554 & nn.30-31 (1973). As to
tax benefit cases, see Note, Constitutionality of Federal Tax Benefits to Private Segregated
Schools, I I WAKE FOREST L. REV. 289 (1975); Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 414 (1973); 13 DuQ. L. REV. 329 (1974); 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 134 (1975). For
judicial categorizations see Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1975);
Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf.,
516 F.2d 1328, 1331 (3d Cir. 1975); Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 513 F.2d 873, 878-79 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975). For early post-Jackson predictions of the effect of
Jackson on these theories, see Judicial Perpetuation, supra note 26; 53 N.C.L. REV. 817
(1975).
84. Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
85. See Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 479 F.2d 153, 165 (6th Cir. 1973) (state action
found in the termination of service by a utility that was "fully circumscribed by an
all-encompassing system of state statutes, city ordinances and supervision of state regulatory
authority").
86. See Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363 (D. Ore. 1975) (control
evidenced by state appointment of 3 of 7 members of board of directors found insufficient);
Comment, Constitutional Restrictions on Termination of Services by Private Owned Public
Utilities, 39 Mo. L. REV. 205 (1974).
The initial requirement for application of this theory is that the state be
"sufficiently" connected with the private activity.8 7 "Comprehensive,"
"heavy" or "pervasive" regulation does not ipso facto support state
action findings. 88 Thus, the fact that a hospital is inspected by a state board
of health89 or operates specified medical programs for the state9' falls
short, per se, of sufficient state connection. Courts look to the "extent and
intrusiveness of the government regulatory scheme" 9' for some connota-
tion of state approval of the defendant's activities.
92
However pervasive or intrusive state regulation may be, recent cases
indicate that some nexus must exist between the state involvement and the
challenged act or policy. 93 This requirement was voiced by the Supreme
Court in Moose Lodge,94 in which the Court found no connection between
liquor license regulations and the club's guest policies, and in Jackson,95 in
which it held that state approval of the utility's general tariff was unrelated
to the termination of plaintiff's service. It is not clear what sort of nexus
would have satisfied the Court in Jackson,96 but few courts have since
found the requirement to be met.
97
87. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974).
88. Brown v. D.C. Transit Sys., 523 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Barrera v. Security
Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1171 (5th Cir. 1975).
89. Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363, 368 (D. Ore. 1975).
90. Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (N.D. III. 1975).
91. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974).
92. See Ginn v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1976); Uhl v. Ness City, 406 F. Supp.
1012, 1016 (D. Kan. 1975); Stearns v. VFW, 394 F. Supp. 138, 146 (D.D.C. 1975). It has been
held, moreover, that the government has no affirmative duty to prohibit complained of acts,
i.e., that state action cannot be based on governmental inaction. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of
Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 1975); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1110 (3d Cir. 1974);
see notes 248-248a and accompanying text infra.
93. Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 536 F.2d 1,4-5 (3d Cir. 1976); Brown v. D.C.
Transit Sys., 523 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1975); New York City Jaycees v. United States
Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir. 1975); Driscoll v. International Union of Op. Eng., Local
139,484 F.2d 682,690 (7th Cir. 1973); Baron v. Carson, 410 F. Supp. 299,303 (N.D. II1. 1976);
Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pen. & Sec., 400 F. Suppp. 249, 261 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Stearns v.
VFW, 394 F. Supp. 138, 143-44 (D.D.C. 1975); Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp.
1072, 1075 (N.D. III. 1975).
94. 407 U.S. at 163-64.
95. 419 U.S. at 354-55.
96. Perhaps the Court would require state involvement in the decision to terminate the
individual plaintiff's service, or perhaps the nexus test would be met by explicit state approval
of defendant's general termination procedure.
A significant contemporary issue is the effect of issuance of state regulations specifying
utilities termination procedures. If the state regulation may be read to explicitly authorize
termination without due process, state action can be argued on a "reliance" theory, seenotes
123-38 and accompanying text infra, as well as a"regulation" theory. See Palmer v. Columbia
Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973). If the state regulation requires that opportunity for a
hearing be provided, but in the case at bar the utility fails to comply with that requirement,
another state action question arises. If the Jackson nexus is satisfied by state regulation of the
challenged activity, i.e., termination, and if one applies by analogy the "direct" state action
principle that actors are not immunized by acting outside the scope of their authority, see
notes 107, 201 and accompanying text infra, state action could be argued under a "regulation"
theory although not under a "reliance" theory, seenotes 123-38 and accompanying text infra.
On the other hand, defendant might counter that there is no "imprimatur" and that the
infringement cannot "fairly be said to be the act of the state itself," see note 299 infra. A likely
holding, consistent with the current restrictive doctrine, would be that the nexus is not
provided unless the state participates in the decision to terminate the individual plaintiff's
service.
97. Post-Jackson decisions finding an adequate nexus have relied upon state directives
to perform the specific act in question. See Weiss v. J.C. Penney Co., 414 F. Supp. 52, 54
(N.D. III. 1976); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976); note 104
infra.
Some recent cases go beyond the standard of a "close ' 98 or "suffi-
ciently close" 99 nexus and require that the state "encourage" or "fos-
ter,"l°° or even "compel" 10 ' or "order,''' 0 2 the "very activity"' 3 of
which the plaintiff complains. Thus it would seem that mere governmental
regulation will not suffice unless direct governmental control is shown. 104
It is apparent, however, that to mandate that the infringement of a
plaintiff's rights result from a direct governmental edict would be to require
"direct" state action, i.e., action by the state itself, and would seem to
preclude recovery in any case of "indirect" state action, i.e., action by an
ostensibly private party in which the state is indirectly implicated. 104a Even
a cursory reading of Moose Lodge10 5 and Jackson'06 discloses that the
Court did not intend such a drastic result, but would have allowed an
"indirect" state action finding given an adequate nexus. Conversely,
governmental prohibition of the challenged act need not preclude a finding
of state action. 
107
2. Governmental Support.-Another common argument is that
state involvement is evidenced by the granting of governmental aid to the
private activity.108 Proof that the activity receives public funds is insuffi-
98. McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 1976);
Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri State J.C. of C., 508 F.2d 1031, 1033(8th Cir. 1975).
99. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); New York City
Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir. 1975).
100. Player v. Ala. Dep't of Pen. & Sec., 400 F. Supp. 249,261 (M.D. Ala. 1975). Seenote
134 and accompanying text infra.
101. Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1170-71 (5th Cir. 1975).
102. Jackson has been cited as imposing such a requirement. Teleco, Inc. v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 511 F.2d 949, 952 (10th Cir. 1975); 53 N.C.L. REV. 817, 820 (1975); 9 U.
RIcH. L. REV. 760, 763 (1973). But see notes 105-06 and accompanying text infra.
103. Driscoll v. International Union of Op. Eng., Local 139, 484 F.2d 682,690 (7th Cir.
1973).
104. Cases in which this "directive" criterion was met include Doe v. Charleston Area
Medical Center, 529 F.2d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1975) (policy based on state anti-abortion
statute); Uhl v. Ness City, 406 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Kan. 1975) (termination of utility service
pursuant to municipal ordinance); Condosta v. Vermont Elec. Coop., 400 F. Supp. 358 (D. Vt.
1975) (Public Service Board instruction to defendant to terminate plaintiff's service); Aasum
v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363 (D. Ore. 1975) (Board of Medical Examiners
recommendation that defendant prevent unlicensed persons from using facilities). Cf. Cohen
v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 1975) (failure to allege that state had"affirmatively supported or expressly approved any discriminatory act or policy"); Scott v.
Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1975) (no contention that decision to
discriminate was influenced by any public official); Stearns v. VFW, 394 F. Supp. 138, 146
(D.D.C. 1975) (no allegation that the government "exercises control, attempts to exercise
control, or otherwise intervenes").
104a. See note 5 supra.
105. "Our cases make clear that the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not
originate with the State .... ." 407 U.S. at 172. See note 5 supra.
106. Although the Court mentioned in dictum that the action had not been specifically
authorized and approved by the state and that the PUC had not "put its own weight on the side
of the proposed practice by ordering it," 419 U.S. at 357, to read these remarks as imposing a
strict requirement of governmental directive goes too far. The Court spent considerable time
examining indirect state action criteria.
107. Basic agency principles may come into play. A principal is not immunized merely by
instructing an agent not to infringe plaintiff's rights unless on the facts the agent is found to
have acted outside the scope of his authority. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 216,230,
231 (1958); W. SELL, AGENCY § 96 (1975).
108. Support frequently accompanies regulation. See Ginn v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 477
(9th Cir. 1976); Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975); Jackson
v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974); Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523, 526
(E.D. Pa. 1976). State action is likely to be found if both aid and control of the federal
cient per se, '09 but such proof may "brighten" a plaintiff's "prospects for
success on the state action issue." ' 10 The amount of support.. and the
degree to which the defendant depends upon itt 12 may be significant.
Support need not take the form of direct monetary payments. Other
types of support frequently placed in issue include state-granted monopoly
status, tax benefits, and use of public property or facilities. While early
cases suggested that by granting monopoly status the state might implicate
itself in actions of private organizations," 3 even the traditional view
recognized that this factor is not controlling, 114 and recent decisions
indicate that it is relatively unimportant. 115
Similarly, the granting of tax benefits, incentives and exemptions
need not control. Although the Second Circuit's suggestion in 1974 that
state action might exist if the defendant is "substantially dependent" on
tax exempt status116 aroused attention in academic circles, 1 7 it is clear that
this status is but one of numerous factors to be considered'18 and that tax
government are involved, e.g., Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Inv., 504
F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988,994-97 (S.D. Ga.
1975); Walton v. Darby Town Houses, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see42 U.S.C. §
2000d (1970). If a statute provides support but prohibits state control it would seem that courts
should look to the statute's implementation rather than its verbiage. But see Spark v. Catholic
Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
109. New York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975); Spark
v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sament v. Hahnemann Medical
College & Hosp., 413 F. Supp. 434, 439 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Berrios v. Memorial Hosp., 403 F.
Supp. 1222, 1224 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363 (D.
Ore. 1975); Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. I11. 1975); cf. Large v.
Reynolds, 414 F. Supp. 45 (W.D. Va. 1976) (acknowledging its own finding as "tenuous").
110. Ripon Soc'y v. National Rep. Party, 525 F.2d 567, 575 (D.D.C. 1975).
11I. If the support is de minimis, state action will not be found. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of
Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 516 F.2d 1328 (3d
Cir. 1975).
112. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407 n.l (2d Cir. 1975);Jacksonv. Statler
Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974). The proportion of the organization's needs satisfied
by the state support may also be considered. Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 516 F.2d
1328, 1334-36 (3d Cir. 1975).
113. "The common law emphasis on the monopolistic character of a public interest
business has continued to pervade judicial analysis of what constitutes 'state action'. "
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 664 (7th Cir. 1972). Although the Moose
Lodge majority decided that the monopoly factor was unimportant to the outcome, they did
consider it: "The limited effect of the prohibition against obtaining additional club licenses
• . . falls far short of conferring upon club licensees a monopoly... " 407 U.S. at 177.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, viewed defendant's monopoly status as critical. Id. at 182. See
Judicial Perpetuation, supra note 26, at 731-34.
114. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974) ("Traditional state
monopolies . . . do not by their mere provision constitute a showing of state involvement
. ... ); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952) (expressly disclaiming
reliance on monopoly factor).
115. Brown v. D.C. Transit Sys., 523 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (operation under
"exclusive franchise" not controlling); cf. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75,78 (9th
Cir. 1975) (de facto monopoly).
116. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 634 (2d Cir. 1974); see note 75 supra.
117. See Brown, State Action Analysis of Tax Expenditures, II HARV. Civ. RTS. L. REV.
97 (1976); Note, Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Federal Tax Benefits to Private
Segregated Schools, I 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 289 (1975); Comment, Tax Incentives as State
Action, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 414 (1973); 24 DRAKE L. REV. 425 (1975); 13 DuQ. L. REV. 329
(1974); 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 288 (1975); 40 Mo. L. REV. 137 (1975); 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 578
(1974); 53 TEX. L. REV. 138 (1975); 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 134 (1975).
118. See Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 414,470 (1973)
(listing reasons why tax incentives might fail to activate constitutional restrictions); 44 U.
CIN. L. REV. 134 (1975) (state action tests in tax exemption cases).
benefits cannot support a state action finding absent some nexus with the
challenged act. 119
The use of public property and facilities is another indicator of state
involvement, but it will not satisfy the nexus test absent a showing that the
defendant has received preferential treatment in the use of "rationed"
facilities to the exclusion of others and that this preference was related to
the challenged activities. 120
The critical inquiries in "support" arguments are whether the support
connotes state approval of the organization's policies121 and whether there
exists a nexus between the support and the specific challenged act. 122
3. Reliance on Law.-1 23Another theory, related to governmental
regulation or control, is that state action may be found in the reliance by
private parties on state or federal constitutions, statutes, regulations,
common law, custom, or usage as the basis for their actions. 124 A
well-known example is found in Reitman v. Mulkey,125 in which defen-
dants relied on a California constitutional amendment providing that the
right of individuals to sell or lease real property to persons of their choice
could not be abridged by the state or its agencies. Their reliance resulted in
housing discrimination, state action requirements were satisfied, and the
provision was declared unconstitutional. 1
26
Since most private activities can be traced to some statutory authoriza-
tion, to find state action on that basis alone would tend to "emasculate the
state action concept" 127 by extending constitutional restrictions beyond the
limits of practicable enforceability and constitutional intent. Courts have
119. This nexus would be provided, for example, if statutory qualification for tax
exempt status required engaging in the challenged activities. See Walz v. Tax Comm., 397
U.S. 664, 675-76 (1970); New York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856, 859
(2d Cir. 1975); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
120. Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 516 F.2d 1328, 1333, 1335 (3d Cir. 1975).
121. Conversely, one must ask whether the support is merely given to a large number of
organizations regardless of their policies. Id. at 1333; Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d
623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974).
122. Williams v. Howard Univ., 528 F.2d 658, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1976), citing Spark v.
Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see note 119 supra.
If funds are earmarked for functions totally unrelated to the challenged activities, even
the provision of a large proportion of a defendant's budget may fail to show state action. New
York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975); Junior Chamber of
Commerce v. Missouri State J.C. of C., 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975) (31.4% of budget from
federal funds). Perhaps a suitable test, focusing on the interface between "support" and"control" theories, is whether cutting off the governmental aid would directly stop the
challenged action. See note 108 supra.
123. This "reliance" theory and the two following theories, enforcement by governmen-
tal officials or institutions and delegation of governmental power, are commonly combined
under the title "action under color of law." To preclude confusion of these theories with the"color of state law" requirement of § 1983, however, and to add clarity to the analysis, these
types of state involvement are discussed individually in this comment.
124. "Custom" is specifically enunciated in § 1983; see D'Ercole v. D'Ercole, 407 F.
Supp. 1377, 1381 n.8 (D. Mass. 1976). See generally LAFRANCE, supra note 3, at 456, 458;
Bristow, supra note 6, at 272-74; Judicial Perpetuation, supra note 26, at 736-37.
125. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
126. The court found that the constitutional provision did not merely repeal existing law
forbidding private racial discrimination, but that it authorized discrimination. Id. at 380-81.
See also Catrone v. Massachusetts State Racing Comm., 404 F. Supp. 765 (D. Mass. 1975)
(legislative scheme giving defendant power to exclude plaintiff).
127. Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851, 855 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
long recognized that state action is not demonstrated by showing the
exercise of a choice that is merely allowed by law if the initiative comes
from the defendant rather than the state.' 28 Reliance on statutes does not
denote state action if in enacting the statutes "the state [was] merely
discharging its normal function of clarifying rights in a gray area where the
failure to do so would leave the outcome to a private test of strength." 129
Recent cases tend to require a showing that the law "significantly fosters"
or "affirmatively encourages" the challenged act.130 It has been
suggested, however, that the statute relied upon need not be affirmative or
explicit if it enables the defendant to exercise rulemaking powers and the
state benefits from the defendant's acts. 131 Conversely, if the defendant's
rights were created by contract 132 and the private contractual arrangement
is merely regulated by the state, or if state law specifically prohibits the
defendant's acts, 133 there is little hope in any "reliance" argument.
Some courts have suggested that for state action to be found under the
"reliance" theory, the statute in question must create rights that did not
exist at common law 134 or must be enacted in contravention of a constitu-
tional goal. 135 Others have argued convincingly that the issue should not be
left to turn upon the "vagaries of the past. "136 One court has suggested that
"mere legalization" of activities that formerly were illegal does not denote
state action, 137 while another found state action when a statute "authorized
conduct that would otherwise be impermissible. "138 An appropriate reso-
lution of this split would be to recognize the creation of a formerly
128. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
129. Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 204 (lst Cir. 1975).
130. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967), this requirement was met: "The
California Supreme Court believes that the [constitutional amendment] will significantly
encourage and involve the State in private discriminations." See Doe v. Charleston Area
Medical Center, 529 F.2d 638,644 (4th Cir. 1975) (policy based on "what was thought to be the
compulsion of state law"); Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1170-71(5th
Cir. 1975); Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851, 855 (N.D. Cal. 1975); cf. Scott v. Eversole
Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1975).
131. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
132. Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1172 (5th Cir. 1975); Kenly v.
Miracle Properties, 412 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-76 (D. Ariz. 1976); 7 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 176,
177 (1975).
133. Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1975) (discrimination
specifically prohibited by California law).
134. See Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1975); Shirley v. State Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 739,742 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324,
337-38 (9th Cir. 1974); Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153, 162 (6th Cir. 1973);Tedeschi v.
Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1976); Boland v. Essex Cy. Bank & Trust Co., 361 F.
Supp. 917, 919 (D. Mass. 1973).
135. Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150, 155-56 (7th Cir. 1975).
136. [W]e are disinclined to decide the issue. . . on the basis whether a particular
class of creditor did or did not enjoy the same freedom to act in Elizabethan or
Georgian England. The statute at issue is a fairly unremarkable product of the
continuing legislative function to define creditors' rights.
Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201,203 (1 st Cir. 1975). The court went on to find that the statute
in question merely broadened the class of persons who could avail themselves of certain rights
and did not support state action. Id. It has also been held that the absence of common-law
origin is only one fact to be weighed and is not per se dispositive of state action. Kenly v.
Miracle Properties, 412 F. Supp. 1072, 1074-75 (D. Ariz. 1976).
137. Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1975). But seeRendleman, The New
Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 532, 574 (1975).
138. Tedeschi v. Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34, 41-43 (D. Conn. 1976).
nonexistent remedy as indicative but not alone demonstrative of affirma-
tive state support of the challenged activity. Whether the support is
sufficiently "affirmative" to denote state action is a subjective
determination.
4. Enforcement by Governmental Officials or Institutions.- 13 9
State action may be found when the policies of private parties are enforced
by governmental officers' 40 or institutions14 that effectively place state
sanctions behind the private actors.142 Generally, the state must play an
affirmative and integral role in the defendant's activities as, for example,
by transferring title to property when such transfer would be otherwise
impossible. 143 Purely "ministerial" acts of public officials in response to
private impetus do not constitute enforcement.'I" On the other hand, a
showing of conspiracy leading to enforcement may establish state
action. 145 Since enforcement, to have effect, must be causally related to the
alleged infringement of the plaintiff's rights, the "nexus" requirement is
implicit in this theory.
A state institution frequently implicated in "enforcement" arguments
is the judicial establishment. 16 Courts may involve the state by ratifying a
defendant's decisions, as distinct from merely acknowledging a free choice
or providing a neutral forum. 147 For state action to be present, the court
must "effectuate a purpose which could not have been secured but for its
decision."1 8 A form of "double enforcement" may arise when public
139. See note 123 supra. The "enforcement" theory is distinguishable from the "con-
spiracy" theory discussed at notes 197-201 and accompanying text infra, in that the latter
involves direct arrangements with state officials prior to the challenged act while "enforce-
ment" may result from an independent state decision. It is also distinguishable from "direct"
state action, in which a state official carries out the challenged act and is himself the
defendant; see note 5 supra.
140. See Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C 1975) (clerk of court and
sheriff). But see Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (county recorder's
involvement insufficient). See also Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D.
Mich. 1974) (Secretary of State).
141. Cf. D'Ercole v. D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp. 1377, 1381 (D. Mass. 1976) (tenancy by
entireties).
142. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972).
143. Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
144. Board of Educ. No. 53 v. Board of Educ. No. 52, 532 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1976);
Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1976); Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco, Inc., 413 F.
Supp. 804 (E.D. Va. 1976); Kenly v. Miracle Properties, 412 F. Supp. 1072, 1076-77 (D. Ariz.
1976). Compare Weiss v. J.C. Penney Co., 414 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. I11. 1976).
145. Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1976); Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco,
Inc., 413 F. Supp. 804,807 (E.D. Va. 1976); seenotes 197-201 and accompanying text infra.
146. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (enforcement of restrictive covenants);
Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 402 F. Supp. 95 (D. Hawaii 1975) (condemnation proceed-
ings); Walton v. Darby Town Houses, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (state court
eviction of tenant from federally subsidized housing development). See Girard v. 94th St. &
Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1976); State Action: Theories, supra note 10, at
677-80; Comment, State Action and the Constitutionality of UCC§ 9-503, 30 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 547, 563-66 (1973).
147. To say that an open courthouse door constitutes 'state action' is to demean the
judicial process. Such a conclusion would provide future litigants an opportunity to
raise a § 1983 claim, based on conclusory allegations of discrimination, every time a
state court construed a contractual provision, nondiscriminatory on its face,
against the litigant's interests.
Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450,455 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d
66 (2d Cir. 1976).
148. Id. at 454.
officers carry out a court order or judgment that itself enforces private
rights, as when the sheriff takes control of condemned property. 149
5. Delegation of Governmental Power.-In "delegation" or
"power grant" cases, the private party may be considered an instrumental-
ity of the state. 150 The crux of this theory is to show an affirmative act of
delegation. 5' The grant of "license" and the grant of "authority" by state
law may be distinguished. 52 Noting this distinction, one decision indicates
that a "direct vesting of authority" is necessary. 53 It has been held that
although some powers are delegated, state action does not exist if the
delegee is permitted to exercise independent judgment in the matter at
issue. 154 It has also been suggested that for state action to be found the
delegated power must be a "traditional" state function.
155
Ministerial acts such as issuance of a license, charter 156 or permit do
not indicate state action unless they provide a "special authorization or
directive to engage in the challenged conduct." 157 Moreover, a private
organization that routinely operates as a state agency may commit purely
private acts that do not constitute state action. 158 Whatever a defendant's
theoretical powers may be, it is clear that a controversy involving state
action first arises when those powers are exercised. 59
149. See Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 402 F. Supp. 95 (D. Hawaii 1975). The question
remains, of course, whether the court merely provided a neutral forum and the sheriff's acts
were merely ministerial, in which case state action would not be indicated.
150. See Timson v. Weiner, 395 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. Oh. 1975) (attorney's subpoena
power). Cf. Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363 (D. Ore. 1975) (hospital
governing board empowered by state legislature); Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645
(M.D.N.C. 1975) (power to enforce liens). See also State Action: Theories, supra note 10, at
664-72.
151 . Powers conferred on a select few are to be distinguished from those available to all
private citizens as a matter of right. Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (D.S.C. 1976).
152. See Warner v. Croft, 406 F. Supp. 717, 720 n.2 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
153. Battle v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 399 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D. Minn. 1975) (shoplifting
statute authorizing limited detention).
154. Berryman v. Shuster, 405 F. Supp. 1346 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (public defender). See
Sebastian v. United States, 531 F.2d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 1976) (legal aid attorney); Gozansky &
Kertz, Private Lawyers' Liability Under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 24 EMORY L.J. 959 (1975).
155. When this is the case the "delegation" theory overlaps the "public function"
theory. See notes 166-81 and accompanying text infra. See Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th
Cir. 1970) (landlord entry and seizure of property); Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655
(D.N.J. 1975) (political caucus). Cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352
(1974) (limited power of eminent domain); Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975)
(landlord distraint).
156. The grant of a corporate charter is a ministerial funcion and does not lead to state
action. Sament v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 413 F. Supp. 434, 439 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
157. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 1975); Spark v. Catholic
Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Potomac Riv. Ass'n v. Lundeberg
Md. Sea. Sch., 402 F. Supp. 344,354 n.9 (D. Md. 1975); Holmes v. Elks Club, 389 F. Supp. 854
(M.D. Fla. 1975). See Stearns v. VFW, 394 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975) (distinguishing private
bylaws from federal charter).
158. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 665 (7th Cir. 1972) (finding that
the utility acted as an agent of the state, but inquiring "whether the act involved here was an
integral part of such state action or was merely a private act by the utility disassociated from
its public business," and ultimately finding no state action in the termination of plaintiff's
service).
159. Id. at 656. The utility had not exercised its authority to enter private property. "If
that authority were invoked . . . an entirely different issue would be presented."
To conceive of private parties as "instrumentalities" of the state is not
to consider them state agents, and the extent to which agency principles
may be applied by analogy in "delegation" situations is unclear. 16°
Vicarious liability and respondeat superior do not directly apply since the
liability to be proved .is that of the private party rather than the state. 161 If
agency were to exist in the strict sense, there would be no "indirect" state
action question to resolve because the defendant would be a "direct" state
actor.' 62 Short of this result, courts look for circumstances that make a
defendant's acts tantamount to, if not actually, direct state action. 163 For
example, state action may be found from the use of a state's name,164 but
probably not unless the resulting appearance of state involvement either
facilitates the challenged actions or is corroborated by other evidence that
the defendant is, in effect, a state instrumentality. 165
6. Performance of a Public Function.-Under the classical "public
function" theory it is argued that private persons are subject to constitu-
tional restrictions if they perform certain functions traditionally reserved to
the state or associated with sovereignty. 166 This theory has been severely
limited, however, 167 and does not apply merely because of statutory
delegation of duty, 168 because the defendant holds a business open to the
public, 169 or because the defendant's business is "affected with the public
interest." 170 It applies only to functions that are "so clearly governmental
160. See generally State Action: Theories, supra note 10, at 680-85.
161. Respondeat superior is also inapplicable to establish liability of an actor's superior
under § 1983. Weiss v. J.C. Penney Co., 414 F. Supp. 52, 53-54 (N.D. I11. 1976); Padover v.
Gimbel Bros., Inc., 412 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The present discussion considers the
applicability of agency principles to establish the "state action" link between the state and an
"agent" actor to establish the actor's liability.
162. See note 5 supra.
163. Unlike government agents, state action defendants are presumed to act in a private
capacity unless state involvement (by analogy, agency) is proven with respect to the specific
act in question. See note 158 supra.
164. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
165. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 824-25 (7th Cir. 1975).
166. See Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (landlord entry and seizure,
traditional function of sheriff); Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655 (D.N.J. 1975) (political
caucus, "integral part of legislative process"); cf. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (dubious dictum that management of scholastic sports is a public function).
The public function theory is distinguishable from the "delegation" theory in that the power
may be assumed rather than granted, although occasionally the theories overlap. See Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (public function of political party, reliance on state statute);
Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (public function in seizure of
tenants' property, reliance on innkeeper's lien statutes); Timson v. Weiner, 395 F. Supp. 1344
(S.D. Oh. 1975) (public function of subpoena, delegated power); Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp.
645 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (public function of lien enforcement, power delegated to lienors,
enforced by Department of Motor Vehicles).
167. See New York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856, 859-60 (2d Cir.
1975).
168. Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (E.D. Wis.
1975).
169. It has been argued that a public function may attach to land in certain uses, see
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296(1966). ButseeHudgensv. NLRB,96S. Ct. 1029, 1036(1976);
Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Va. 1976) ("situs" criterion
abolished).
170. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
in nature that the state cannot be permitted to escape responsibility by
allowing them to be managed by a supposedly private agency" 171 or cases
in which there is a "substitution of private for public authority."1
7 2
Declining to expand the public function doctrine, the Supreme Court
indicated in Jackson that state action will not be found unless the defendant
performs a function that has been exclusively reserved to the state, 173 and
one that the state has an affirmative, statutorily imposed duty to per-
form. 174 Although the literal imposition of the latter requirement seems
unduly restrictive, 175 some form of state recognition of responsibility may
be necessary. Whatever its form, such recognition merely suggests and
will not alone support a finding of state action.
176
The requirement that for state action to exist the "public function"
performed must be a traditional, exclusive duty of the state creates a theory
that is not only narrow but incapable of expansion should the government
recognize broader responsibilities. Major fields of activity in which the
state commonly participates, including education 177 and hospital care,
178
have been held not to be public functions, and early decisions relying on the
public function theory have become doubtful precedent. 179 State action
may be strongly argued, however, if the defendant's activities are an
integral part of the governmental system 180 or exert direct control over
activities of the general public.'
8'
171. New York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1975),
quoting Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968).
172. Ve-ri-tas, Inc. v. Advertising Review Council, 411 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (D. Colo.
1976); see Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137, 1139-40 (D.S.C. 1976).
173. 419 U.S. at 352; see New York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856,
859-60 (2d Cir. 1975); Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1050
(E.D. Wis. 1975).
174. 419 U.S. at 353.
175. The "common-law" nature of the public function theory suggests that the perform-
ance of a traditional state function may constitute state action absent any statutory acknowl-
edgement of responsibility by the state.
176. In Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pen. & Sec., 400 F. Supp. 249,262 (M.D. Ala. 1975),
for example, the public function argument failed even though Alabama statutes did impose
responsibility on the state to provide care for dependent, neglected and delinquent children, a
duty that was delegated to defendant. The court set the requirement that the function be one
that was "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State," noting that defendant religious
homes had performed their function "long before the state recognized any responsibility in
the field of child care .... "
177. See note 50 and accompanying text supra; Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1063 (1968).
178. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1975).
179. The public function doctrine has been described as a "slender analytical reed upon
which to lean, for it admits of practically no limitation." Milner v. National School of Health
Technology, 409 F. Supp. 1389, 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1976), citing Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of
Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974). It is debatable whether the holding of Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966), that the management of public parks is a public
function, would stand up today.
180. See Timson v. Weiner, 395 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. Oh. 1975) (process servers);
Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655 (D.N.J. 1975) (political caucus).
181. See Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (regulation of schools);
DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak, 511 F.2d 306,311 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum). Mere influence in the
community, id., or monopoly status, Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 77-78 (9th
Cir. 1975), is not enough.
7. Entwinement.--Cases that fail to cross the state action threshold
by any of the above theories may nevertheless qualify if the private activity
is intimately connected with the state in a relationship variously described
as "entwinement," "symbiosis," "entanglement," "insinuation into a
position of interdependence," "joint venture," or "joint enterprise."'
8 2
This theory, as articulated in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,'
83
has supported state action findings in a number of post-Jackson deci-
sions ' 1 despite its restricted applicability. 185 The entwinement theory does
not apply unless the state and the private activity are "inextricable partners
in a joint effort" 186 who exchange an "incidental variety of mutual
benefits"' 8 7 and the state directly profits from the challenged act or
policy. 
88
Entwinement is distinguishable from mere contractual privity.
Although entwinement has been found in one case between the federal
government and a defense contractor,' 8 9 contractual relationships will
generally not support the theory' 90 unless there is a direct corrolation
between the plaintiff's injury and the government's gain.' 9' Absent such a
nexus, state action is not demonstrated by proving any general symbiosis
such as a lessor-lessee relationship.1
92
182. Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); Player v. Alabama
Dep't of Pen. & Sec., 400 F. Supp. 249,263 (M.D. Ala. 1975); seeScott v. Eversole Mortuary,
522 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1975). Such a relationship differs from conspiracy in that no
direct agreement between the defendant and the state is necessary. The validity of using
agency terms such as joint enterprise and vicarious liability is doubtful since principles of
agency law may be applied only tangentially. See Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp.
118, 124 (W.D. Pa. 1975); notes 160-62 and accompanying text supra.
183. 365 U.S. 715(1961); seenotes 16-17 and accompanying text supra. The entwinement
theory requires (1) that the government or its instrumentality and the private party be
interrelated to the extent that the government benefits directly from the private party's
actions in depriving plaintiff of constitutional rights, and (2) that the government possess at
least potential power to control the defendant's activities and correct the constitutional
infringement. Thus, in Burton, the Parking Authority, which was presumably aware of
defendant's discriminatory actions, could have exercised the powers inherent in its lessor-
lessee relationship with the restaurant to require compliance with federal Civil Rights Acts at
pain of termination of defendant's lease. Since a true symbiosis with the requisite elements of
knowledge and power is the exception rather than the rule, the entwinement theory should be
seen as quite limited in scope.
184. Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975); Howard Univ. v. NCAA,
510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
185. See Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1975). Burton was
distinguished, not overruled, in Moose Lodge and Jackson; see Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510
F.2d 213, 219 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118, 125 (W.D.
Pa. 1975).
186. Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pen. & Sec., 400 F. Supp. 249, 263 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
187. Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
188. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638,653 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The state is
neither a 'joint participant' [with defendant] nor a 'direct beneficiary' of [defendant's] action
in the sense in which those words were used in Burton .... ").
In Burton, the profits derived from the restaurant's racial discrimination were "indis-
pensable elements in the financial success of a governmental agency." 365 U.S. at 724.
189. Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975); see 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311
(1976).
190. "Most contracts, whether public or private, confer benefits upon the contracting
parties. The interdependence found in Burton was more extensive." Scott v. Eversole
Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1975).
191. See Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 289-90 (2d Cir. 1975) (connection
between discharge of dissident employee and prevention of labor unrest).
192. See Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1975) (no nexus
between state gain of morgue service and plaintiff's harm through burial service); Gerrard v.
A corollary of the entwinement theory is that "entwinement through
dominant membership and participation" of public organizations in a
private parent organization may indicate state action.193 In Howard
University v. NCAA,1 94 for example, state-supported institutions played a
substantial role in determining NCAA programs' 95 and the NCAA and its
member public institutions were "joined in a mutually beneficial relation-
ship, . . . the type of symbiotic relationship between public and private
entities [that] triggers constitutional scrutiny.'"
' 96
8. Conspiracy.-State action may be found on the part of private
persons who conspire with public officials to infringe upon a plaintiff's
rights. 197 Application of this theory is to be distinguished from conspiracy
suits under section 1985 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in which state
action is not required. 198 In early cases, the conspiracy theory was found to
Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (N.D. II1. 1975).
Burton's reliance on the lessor-lessee relationship led courts to attribute considerable
significance to the lease. Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1975);
Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 513 F.2d 873,880(5th Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1000(1975);
Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pen. & Sec., 400 F. Supp. 249, 263 (M.D. Ala. 1975). In Moose
Lodge the Court itself distinguished Burton in that public land ownership was at issue in the
latter, 407 U.S. at 174-75; in Jackson it appeared to limit Burton to lessor-lessee cases, 419
U.S. at 358. See Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118, 125 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655, 659 (D.N.J. 1975). Unless the other elements of the
entwinement theory are present, however, a lease has little significance. Burton v. Wilming-
ton Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961).
193. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Compare Leffel v.
Wisconsin Intershc. Athl. Ass'n, 398 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (exertion of influence on
public high school athletic programs).
194. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
195. NCAA policies were "affected by the concerted action of the many state and
federal institutions that participate as NCAA members in the promulgation and enforcement
of the Association's rules, regulations and procedures." Id. at 216-17.
196. Id. at 220. The court made the following observations as to the quantum of
involvement required:
If the NCAA was composed of solely public institutions, clearly state action
would be present. In contrast, if the NCAA had no public members, its actions
would be private for constitutional purposes. Drawing the line as to the requisite
quantum of public participation to invoke fourteenth amendment protections is a
difficult task indeed. However, that is unnecessary in this case where the degree of
public participation and entanglement between the entities is substantial and
pervasive.
Id.
197. Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 152, 158 (1970)(notingacommonunderstandingor
"meeting of the minds"); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69, 75 (8th Cir. 1976)
(dictum); Timo v. Associated Indem. Corp., 412 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D. Okla. 1976)
(action "'in concert"); Gaulter v. Capdeboscq, 404 F. Supp. 900, 903 (E.D. La. 1975);
Vazquez v. Ferre, 404 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1975); Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (must be "willful participation"). But cf. Ve-ri-tas, Inc. v. Advertising
Review Council, 411 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (D. Colo. 1976) (no state action despite closely
working with law enforcement officials); Johnson v. Heinemann Candy Co., 402 F. Supp. 714
(E.D. Wis. 1975). See LAFRANCE, supra note 4, at 454 n.53, 458. This theory, as distinct from
others, requires direct coordination between the defendant and public officials in the decision
to commit the challenged act.
Public officials may also be sued as "direct" state actors and may be joined as
defendants. It has been held, however, that color of state law for § 1983 cannot be established
by conspiracy if the officials with whom defendant conspired are immune, "absent other
indications that defendant acted under color of state law." Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137,
1141 (D.S.C. 1976) (citing other precedent); see Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668 (9th Cir.
1976).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)(1970); seeWeise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975);
LAFRANCE, supra note 3, § 405. Compare United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (criminal
action under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)). Section 1985 can be relied upon only if plaintiff can show
apply when restaurant owners conspired with police to arrest blacks during
sit-ins at segregated lunchrooms. 199 More recently, state action has been
found in agreements with police to keep women out of a "men's grill.' 200
That a police officer acts outside the scope of his or her authority while
engaging in such conspiracy is no defense. 20 1 Of course, if public officials
carry out a conspiracy by actively enforcing challenged policies, state
action may be argued on "enforcement" as well as "conspiracy" grounds.
D. Problems of State Action Analysis
1. Application of State Involvement Theories.-Once state
involvement theories are identified the question arises how they should be
applied. Most courts consider them seriatim, requiring that at least one
theory be clearly applicable. 20 2 It has been argued, however, that an
"aggregate" test should be employed, so that state action is demonstrated
if several theories are substantially, though not totally, apposite.2°3 In one
case the theories were applied "seriatim and in the aggregate" without
finding state action. 2°
Perhaps a solution may be found in the judicial observation that each
factor is material but no single factor is conclusive, 20 5 from which one
might infer that some combinations of factors are stronger than others. The
individual or collective strength of the factors is, in the final analysis, a
subjective judicial determination.
20 6
"motivat[ion] of the conspiracy by some racial or other class based invidious discriminatory
animus." Timo v. Associated Indem. Corp., 412 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
199. Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963).
200. Johnson v. Heinemann Candy Co., 402 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
201. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284
U.S. 239 (1931); LAFRANCE, supra note 4, at 453-54.
It has been held, however, that state action does not result from the actions of police
officers unless the state has authorized the actions or they are carried out under "pretense" of
law, Rogers v. Fuller, 410 F. Supp. 187 (M.D.N.C. 1976), citingStengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d
438, 441 (6th Cir. 1975), and that acts in concert with a policeman are state action only if the
police officer's actions are under "pretense" of legal authority, i.e., not wholly in a private
capacity, Warner v. Croft, 406 F. Supp. 717, 721 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (dictum).
202. See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); First Nat'l Bank v.
Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1975).
203. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 360-64 (1974) (dissent); 9 U.
RICH. L. REV. 760, 765-66 (1975). For an example of aggregate application, see Ginn v.
Mathews, 533 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1976), quoting McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 784-85 (1 st
Cir. 1971):
[Wihen a specific governmental function is carried out by heavily subsidized
private firms or individuals whose freedom of decision-making has, by contract and
the reserved governmental power of continuing oversight, been circumscribed
substantially more than that generally accorded an independent contractor, the
coloration of state action fairly attaches.
The theories combined in the McQueen case were public function, support, and control. In
Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1976), findings of support, control, and
reliance supported state action when taken in the aggregate. But seeGrafton v. Brooklyn Law
School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Powe v Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
-204. Stearns v. VFW, 394 F. Supp. 138, 146 (D.D.C. 1975); see Sament v. Hahnemann
Medical College & Hosp., 413 F. Supp. 434, 439-41 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
205. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974).
206. For a case involving a strong combination of factors, see Walton v. Darby Town
Houses, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1975), in which defendants utilized state courts to
effectuate the eviction of a tenant from a federally subsidized housing development built and
To complicate the question of application, the Second Circuit has
adopted a "balancing test" 2 7 and has applied less rigorous standards to
race discrimination allegations than in other cases.208 Extension of this
"double standard" to sex discrimination claims has been advocated
without success. 20 At one point the Second Circuit went even further,
positing a dubious "judicial competence" standard that would set more
restrictive state action requirements in cases in which the courts should not
be "meddling." 
210
It is apparent that state action theories are as prone to judicial
subjectivity in their application as in their formulation. Courts seem willing
to entertain state action arguments under any theory, but with the reserva-
tion that the final subjective determinations lie within judicial discretion.
2. Semantic Obstacles and Ambiguous Concepts.-As has been
seen, one difficulty with present theories of state involvement is the
subjectivity of their application. A related problem is that the theories are
framed in vague terms that add nothing to judicial analysis. Courts require
a "sufficiently close" nexus and "significant" state involvement 211 so
that challenged acts are "in essence" 212 those of the government. Judges
say that they must "sift facts and weigh circumstances" to resolve the state
action issue. 213 Clearly, the existence of state action is a question of
degree, not to be measured by purely objective criteria, but it appears that
semantic problems have unnecessarily clouded inherently fuzzy
distinctions.
The ambiguities of state action analysis have been compounded by
confusion surrounding many fundamental distinctions and concepts.
Courts have ignored the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" state
action or have set standards for the latter that would support findings of the
operated pursuant to federal housing laws. On those facts, strong arguments existed under
support, regulation, reliance and enforcement theories.
207. "As the conduct complained of becomes more offensive, and as the nature of the
dispute becomes more amenable to resolution by a court, the more appropriate it is to subject
the issue to judicial scrutiny." Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975).
208. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Statler
Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974); Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d
66, 69 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'g 396 F. Supp. 450, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing cases). The Fifth
Circuit has also adopted this double standard. Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 513 F.2d 873,
879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975). Others have recommended its adoption or
recognized it as a possible standard. SeeAnastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150,
155 (7th Cir. 1975); Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d I 110, 1113-14 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975);
Sament v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 413 F. Supp. 434, 439 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
209. Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1976); Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1975).
210. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975).
211. Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 536 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1976); Golden v.
Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16, 18 (5th Cir. 1976) (no cause of action unless state
action "significantly enters the lists"); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213,217 (D.C. Cir.
1975), citing Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Spencer v. Community
Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. I11. 1975), citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,407 U.S. 163,
173 (1972); see Note, GoinPublic with Discriminating Private Clubs, 3 FoRDHAM URBAN L.J.
289, 295 (1975) ("miminal 'state involvement not enough). But see Howard Univ. v. NCAA,
510 F.2d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("periperhal" state involvement may suffice).
212. Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri State J.C. of C., 508 F.2d 1031, 1033 (8th
Cir. 1975).
213. Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (often quoted).
former. 2 14 In requiring "affirmative state involvement," courts have
overemphasized an "action-inaction" distinction, 215 failing to perceive
that once the state is adequately implicated in private actions, its failure to
correct injustices may serve to ratify and enforce them.216 There is a lack of
agreement whether the impetus to perform a challenged act must have
originated with the state; 217 to what extent agency principles should be
applied; 218 whether monopoly status, 219 powers of eminent domain, 220 or
lessor-lessee relationships 221 are significant factors; and even whether the
state action inquiry is jurisdictional or substantive.
222
In addition to being plagued by semantic and conceptual problems,
state action analysis is complicated by variations in courts' basic
approaches, 223  inconsistency in application of state involvement
theories, 224 applicability of factual criteria in common to several
theories, 225 the possibility of finding state action for one purpose while not
214. See notes 5, 104a, 162-63 and accompanying text supra.
215. See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 1975) ("omission of
any affirmative prohibition" not "tantamount to express State approval" of objectionable
policy); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397,407 (2d Cir. 1975) ("state approval as opposed
to state passiveness").
216. In Burton the Court indicated that the action-inaction distinction is of little
consequence.
[N]o State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them or by
merely failing to discharge them. . . . By its inaction,. . . the State, has not only
made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power,
property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.
365 U.S. at 725. See also Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118, 125 (W. D. Pa. 1975)
(state action issue "not foreclosed" by state inaction). Of course, to substantiate state action
on the basis of inaction, one must show that the state or its agencies had power to act.
Rodriguez v. Conagra, Inc., 527 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1976). In some circumstances inaction
should preclude state action findings, as when "judicial enforcement" is alleged; see Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
217. Compare Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1170-71 (5th Cir.
1975) (statute did not compel); Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1975) (state did
not encourage); Teleco, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 511 F.2d 949,952 (10th Cir. 1975)
(state did not order proposed practice); Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 1059,
1062-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Srack v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 391 F. Supp. 155, 159 (S.D.
Iowa 1975) (regulation did not say that utility must terminate service), with Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) ("impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not
originate with the State").
218. One writer suggests that respondeat superior may provide the state action nexus,
LAFRANCE, supra note 3, at 458, but it is clear that when the state is not being sued this theory
may be applied only by analogy, see notes 107, 160-65 and accompanying text supra. See also
State Action: Theories, supra note 10, at 680-85.
219. See notes 67, 113-15 and accompanying text supra.
220. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974); Lucas v.
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 656 (7th Cir. 1972).
221. See note 192 supra.
222. See Comment, State Action and the Constitutionality of UCC§9-503, 30 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 547, 551-53 & n.25 (1973).
223. See note 256 and accompanying text infra; 202-210 and accompanying text supra.
224. See 24 DRAKE L. REV. 425,426(1975);6TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1135,1138(1975); notes
236-44 and accompanying text infra.
There is inconsistency among cases within "case lines" and among the circuits. See note
208 and accompanying text supra; note 276 infra. Courts discuss varying analytical formats
running from "bifurcated" to "three-pronged," "four part" or "five part" analysis. Com-
pare Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (E.D. Wis. 1975),
with Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1975); Girard v. 94th St. and
Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450, 453-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); andAasum v. Good Samaritan
Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Ore. 1975).
225. The facts of a single case could support arguments of regulation, support, reliance,
enforcement, delegation, public function, and entwinement, yet not allow a state action
finding. The "nexus" requirement, although not a sine qua non, is critical in nearly all
for another,226 and numerous other problems beyond the scope of this
comment 227
III. The Significance of State Action Analysis
A. The Value of Generalizations
Courts faced with the task of resolving a state action issue typically
note that the Supreme Court has never attempted the "impossible task" of
formulating an infallible test or a comprehensive definition of state
action, 228 but has instead adopted the approach of "sifting facts and
weighing circumstances" enunciated in Burton.229 This approach has been
relied upon in suggesting that precedent might often be disregarded in the
state action inquiry. 230 One court has remarked that" [t]he problem in state
action cases is that demarcation of the spheres, public and private, is a
dynamic process, and the boundaries between the two shift and are
adumbrated by the various factual situations . . . presented for
review." '231 It may indeed be said that few subjects involve greater
perplexity, and that the many criteria that have been laid down can be
classified but never totally harmonized.232
Some commentators have observed that there are strong arguments
against attempting any definitive categorization of criteria. The Court
theories. Statutory delegation of duty may lead to the delegation, regulation or public function
arguments yet not "transform [the] actions [of a private society] into those of the state."
Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
Similarly, state licensing may lead to several theories. See Potomac Riv. Ass'n v. Lundeberg
Md. Sea. Sch., 402 F. Supp. 344 (D. Md. 1975); Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pen. & Sec., 400
F. Supp. 249 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
226. Although utilities usually deny being state actors, they have claimed to be state
actors to avoid antitrust laws. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638,662 (7th Cir.
1972). A university that stipulated that it was not a state agency was held to have waived
eleventh amendment state immunity but to have acted under color of state law for purposes of
§ 1983. Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
227. The following matters also come into consideration: immunities, see ANTIEAU,
supra note 3, §§ 39-42; requirements that defendant be a "person" in statutory terminology,
see Dennis v. College of V.I., 398 F. Supp. 1317, 1318 (D.V.I. 1975); Gordenstein v.
University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718, 719-20 (D. Del. 1974); requirements that an "entitle-
ment" be shown, see Comment, The Entitlement to Municipal Water Service: Constitutional
Problems in the Termination of a Public Utility Service, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 285 (1975); 9 U.
RICH. L. REV. 760, 761-63 nn. 10, 18 (1975); and nonapplicability of respondeat superior, see
note 161 supra.
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or "historical enigma." Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 516 F.2d 1328, 1331 (3d Cir.
1975); Hemphill, State Action and Civil Rights, 23 MERC. L. REV. 519, 530 (1972); 24 CATH.
U.L. REV. 622, 626 (1975).
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230. "[D]ecisions dealing with one form of state involvement and a particular provision
of the Bill of Rights [are not] at all determinative in passing upon claims concerning different
forms of government involvement and other constitutional guarantees." Wahba v. New York
Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1974). See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397,404 (2d Cir.
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1000 (1975).
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argued in Burton that imprecision is necessary if broad application of the
equal protection clause is to be achieved. 233 A "pigeon-hole form of
jurisprudence" 234 has been disparaged on grounds that "generalizations
do not decide concrete cases,''235 and that "differences in circumstances
beget differences in law." 236 Authors have cited telling criticism of the
"elaborate set of indicia" that has evolved. 237 The "sifting and weighing"
procedure of Burton has been defended as "surviv[ing] much better than
attempts at more definitive formulations.' '238
On the other hand, jurists have complained that "the public-private
dichotomy has grown increasingly blurred,''239 lamenting a "lack of
discernible guidelines" 240 and criticizing Burton for failure to afford
sufficient guidance. 241 The Fifth Circuit has expressed approvingly its
belief that the doctrine is in fact undergoing more precise definition. 242
That there is no easy answer to the often close state action question-
no talismanic sine qua non, no rigid formula-is a truism that scarcely
merits repetition. 243 The governing principles of state action are necessar-
ily general. To define tests broadly, in the abstract, without reference to
context, is futile or even hazardous. Yet the leeway for judicial discretion
afforded by an imprecise "doctrine" is a double-edged sword. Play is
given to broad considerations of public policy, 244 but potential defendants
and their counsel are denied any basis for intelligent choice.
Perhaps some of the inconsistencies of the doctrine can be resolved by
relying on the "theories of state involvement" discussed above, not as
principles of law, but as "maxims of experience" that courts have
enunciated in explaining their factual determinations. As the Fifth Circuit
recently observed, "It is enlightening. . . to consult the substantial body
of 'state action' case law for illustrations of the kind and degree of state
involvement which justify the imposition of Constitutional restraints upon
an ostensibly private entity.' 245
233. 365 U.S. at 722.
234. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975).
235. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
236. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974).
237. LAFRANCE, supra note 3, at 450 & n.23.
238. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1974).
239. 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 578 (1974).
240. 6 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1135, 1137 (1975).
241. Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61
COL. L. REV. 1458, 1463 (1961).
242. Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 513 F.2d 873,878 n.9,879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1000 (1975).
243. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Brown v. D.C. Transit
Sys., 523 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407 n. 12 (2d
Cir. 1975); Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974).
244. The Supreme Court commented in Burton that imprecision is necessary for broad
applicability of the equal protection clause, see note 233 and accompanying text supra.
Conversely, proponents of a more restrictive doctrine have favored precise definition to limit
the potential impact of equal protection analysis on the private sector. Greco v. Orange Mem.
Hosp., 513 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975).
245. Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 513 F2d 873, 878 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1000 (1975).
B. Broad Policy Considerations
246
The Supreme Court noted in Evans v. Newton247 that there are two
'complementary principles" to be reconciled in state action cases. One is
the right of private individuals to associate with whomever they choose and
to engage in various activities of a free citizenry without concern for
federally imposed constitutional restrictions. The other is the constitutional
ban on state-sponsored impairment of individuals' rights to due process
and equal protection. Courts must be alert to ferret out attempts by any
public body to "cloak its unconstitutional actions behind a private
entity" 248  or to achieve immunization "through a fictitious
characterization.'" 249
Concern for harm wrought upon the effectiveness of equal protection
legislation by a restrictive state action doctrine has led to the championing
of less restrictive, more liberal applications of the state involvement
tests. 250 Opponents of doctrinal expansion, on the other hand, have noted
the "value of preserving the private sector free from constitutional require-
ments applicable to government institutions''251 and have warned of the
danger of "emasculating the distinction" between private and state con-
duct25 2 or "demean[ing] the judicial process.' 253 They have complained
that the doctrine was "stretched to its constitutional limits" in pre-Jackson
times.254 Noting that "[i]t is neither the intention of [section] 1983 nor the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to circumscribe totally the indi-
vidual liberties and freedoms of the private sector," one court observed
that if the state action concept were "improvidently expanded, freedom of
activity would be seriously and severely curtailed, and the very real
purpose of the Civil Rights Act would be thwarted. "255 Accordingly,
while some decisions display a Burton-based "general involvement"
246. See generally LAFRANCE, supra note 3, at 452; State Action: Theories, supra note
10, at 656-58 & n.16, 660-61.
247. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966).
248. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 5 10 F.2d 213, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Court noted this
danger in Moose Lodge:
There can be no doubt that the label "private club" can be and has been used to
evade both regulations of state and local liquor authorities, and statutes requiring
places of public accommodation to serve all persons without regard to race, color,
religion, or national origin.
407 U.S. at 177-78.
249. Mattheis v. Jockey Club, 387 F. Supp. 1126, 1127 (E.D. Ky. 1975), citing Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
250. See, e.g., LAFRANCE, supra note 3.
251. Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 516 F.2d 1328, 1334 (3d Cir. 1975); New York
City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Statler
Foundation, 496 F.2d 623,639 (2d Cir. 1974); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d
Cir. 1974). "[L]imitation on the scope of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
serves several vital functions in our system. "Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244,250
(1963).
252. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); note 127 and
accompanying text supra.
253. Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(referring to the judicial enforcement cases).
254. Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An
Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1040 (1973).
255. Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 516F.2d 1328, 1334 (3d Cir. 1975) (referring to
restriction of use of public facilities).
analysis, apparently slanted toward finding state action, other courts have
adopted a Jackson-like "particular act" analysis, seemingly biased against
state action.
256
Apart from the competing constitutional claims of liberty and equal-
ity, another significant conflict inherent in state action policy is the clash
between the power of the states and that of the federal government to
regulate the behavior of individuals. 257 It has been argued that if the state
action doctrine were expanded, section 1983 would become "all-
encompassing" 258 and would supersede vast areas of state regulation. The
possibility that plaintiffs could vindicate their interests in state courts 259 or
administrative tribunals26° has been an important factor in several deci-
sions. If an even balance is struck in a given case between the competing
constitutional claims of liberty on the one hand and equality or due process
on the other, this consideration of federalism could determine the outcome.
Courts have stated that the principal variables in state action determi-
nations are "the degree of government involvement, the offensiveness of
the conduct, and the value of preserving a private sector free from the
constitutional requirements applicable to government institutions" ;261 that
"[t]he ultimate question . . . is whether the state . . . can be said to have
sanctioned, fostered, encouraged or identified itself with [a defendant's
acts]" ;262 that "[t]he controlling consideration is whether there is suffi-
cient relationship between the alleged private entity . . . and the State to
make the private entity a defacto public body" ;263 and that the question is
whether a defendant's conduct "may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself." 264 These general tests, with their inherent subjectivity, set the
focus of the contemporary state action inquiry.
The current restrictive state action doctrine may best be accepted if
one considers a basic concept that has sometimes fallen from view but that
neither courts nor litigants should overlook, a concept that was judicially
proclaimed in 1883 and that stands once again on the verge of juridical
256. See Taylor v. Maryland School for the Blind, 409 F. Supp. 148, 151 (D. Md. 1976).
Compare Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975); Howard Univ. v. NCAA,
510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
and Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655 (D.N.J. 1975), with Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of
Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Teleco, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 511 F.2d 949
(10th Cir. 1975); Stearns v. VFW, 394 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975); Srack v. Northern Natural
Gas Co., 391 F. Supp. 155 (S.D. Iowa 1975); andHolmes v. Elks Club, 389 F. Supp. 854 (M.D.
Fla. 1975).
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259. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883); Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505
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261., Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1974).
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"The ultimate substantive question is ... whether the character of the State's involvement
• . . is such that it should be held responsible. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244,
249 (1963).
263. Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (N.D. III. 1975).
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prominence: private acts cannot impair constitutional rights-they can
effect no more than a momentary infringement. In the words of the
Supreme Court,
Civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against
State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of
individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws,
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act
of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a
private wrong, or a crime of that individual . . . but if not
sanctioned in some way by the State . . . [the victim's] rights
remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort
to the laws of the State for redress. . . . Hence, in all those
cases where the Constitution seeks to protect the rights of the
citizen against discriminative and unjust laws of the State by
prohibiting such laws, it is not individual offenses, but abroga-
tion and denial of rights, which it denounces, and for which it
clothes the Congress with power to provide a remedy. This
abrogation and denial of rights, for which the States alone were
or could be responsible, was the great seminal and fundamental
wrong which was intended to be remedied.265
IV. Conclusion
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 266 merely enunciated and eluci-
dated a restrictive trend 267 in state action analysis that had appeared in
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis268 and was visible in lower court decisions
prior to Jackson.269 This trend, though perhaps inevitable, has found
crucial advocacy in the Burger Court, 270 and any uncertainty whether it
will endure was dispelled when Justice Douglas retired and Justice Stevens
was appointed. A comparison of the Douglas dissenting opinions in Moose
Lodge271 and Jackson272 to the Stevens opinions in Lucas v. Wisconsin
Electric Power Co. 2 7 3 and Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology274
leaves little doubt where those men have stood with respect to the basic
policy issues.
State action is not likely to be found in any upcoming case unless the
plaintiff can show that the state has ratified the defendant's acts or has
265. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883).
266. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
267. See Ripon Soc'y v. National Rep. Party, 525 F.2d 567, 574-76 (D.D.C. 1975);
Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (N.D. Iil. 1975); Player v. Alabama Dep't of
Pen. & Sec., 400 F. Sulpp. 249, 262 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Braden v. University of Pitt., 392 F.
Supp. 118, 124-26 (W.D. Pa. 1975); note 21 supra.
268. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
269. See works cited note 10 supra.
270. See quotation note 21 supra.
271. 407 U.S. at 179; see notes 22-23, 113 and accompanying text supra.
272. 419 U.S. at 359 (favoring less restrictive "aggregate" test); see note 24 and
accompanying text supra.
273. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that approval of company's tariff by PSC did
not denote state action; requiring significant, affirmative state support).
274. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975) (requiring allegation of affirmative support or express
approval of the discriminatory act or policy). See notes 49, 51 supra. See also Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (N.D. I11. 1976) (quoting the Cohen require-
ment of a "showing that the state significantly participated in the decision to deny plaintiff
admission").
become significantly involved with the specific actions or policies that
infringe the plaintiff's rights. 275 Whatever division now exists among
specific lines of state action case law must soon be resolved. Whatever
divergence is now found in the circuits276 must soon converge upon
Jackson 's restrictive path.
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